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PEEK AND Spy: A PROPOSAL FOR FEDERAL REGULATION OF
ELECTRONIC MONITORING IN THE WORK PLACE
INTRODUCTION
In 1987, the Office of Technology Assessment reported that employers
were electronically monitoring more than six million employees in the
work place.I Electronic monitoring is most prevalent in industries which
rely on the telephone to conduct business. These industries include:
telemarketing, customer service, airline reservations and telephone oper-
ators.2 Employers use electronic monitoring devices primarily to evalu-
ate employee performance, increase productivity, provide security for
employer property and investigate misconduct.3 However, federal and
state wiretapping laws may impose civil or criminal liability on employ-
ers who choose to monitor employees either overtly or covertly.4
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act ("Title
III") regulates electronic monitoring.5 In 1968, Congress enacted Title
III to protect the privacy of wire and oral communications, and to au-
thorize the interception of wire and oral communications in certain cir-
cumstances.6 Although section 2511 of Title III prohibits any electronic
interception of a wire, oral or electronic communication,7 it contains two
statutory exceptions applicable to employee monitoring in the work
place: the business-extension exception and the consent exception.
1. Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-LIT-333, The Electronic Supervisor: New Technol-
ogy, New Tensions, 5 (1987) [hereinafter OTA Report].
2. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Sept. 25, 1991, A-19.
3. OTA Report, supra note 1, at 91. Employers may also monitor to prevent employees from
leaking industry secrets or committing acts for which a court could hold the employer vicariously
liable. See John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace, N.Y.
L.J., July 6, 1990, at 3.
4. See Kirk W. Munroe, Commercial Eavesdropping: A Catch 22, 63 FLA. B.J. 1, 11 (Mar.
1989) (arguing that a company which monitors to prevent employee misconduct potentially exposes
itself to "lawsuits, penalties and damages").
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988). The Act is generally referred to as Title III.
The scope of communications covered by Title III includes wire, oral and electronic communica-
tions. Title III defines "electronic communications" as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in party by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photoptical system that affects interstate commerce," but ex-
cludes cordless telephones, tone-only paging devices and tracking devices. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (12)
(1988).
6. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N 2112, 2153
[hereinafter 1968 Senate Report].
7. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) provides in part:
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The business-extension exception allows an employer to monitor em-
ployees when a telephone or telegraph component used in the ordinary
course of the business is the device which intercepts the communication.'
Under the consent exception, an employer may electronically monitor
employees who have previously consented to the monitoring. 9 Courts
have struggled in applying both the business-extension and the consent
exception.'" The ambiguous judicial interpretations of these exceptions
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who-
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to inter-
cept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication;
(b) intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor
to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication...
(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of
any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the
information was obtained through the interception or a wire, oral, or electronic communi-
cation in violation of this subsection; or
(d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire, oral or electronic
communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained
through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this
subsection.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1988).
8. The business-extension exception is imbedded in the definition provisions of Title III.
Under § 2511(1) of Title III, an "interception" of wire or oral communications must occur to estab-
lish an actionable violation. Section 2510(4) of Title III defines an "interception" as requiring the
use of an "electronic, mechanical, or other device." Specifically, § 2510(4) provides: "'intercept'
means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communications
through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1988).
However, § 2510(5)(a)'s definition of "electronic, mechanical or other device" excludes an em-
ployer monitoring in the ordinary course of business.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) provides:
(5) "electronic, mechanical, or other device" means any device or apparatus which can be
used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication other than-
(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component
thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic communi-
cation service in the ordinary course of its business and being used by the subscriber or user
in the ordinary course of its business or furnished by such subscriber or user for connection
to the facilities of such service and used in the ordinary course of its business; or (ii) being
used by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its
business, or by an investigative or law enforcement office in the ordinary course of his
duties.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) (1988).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) provides:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to
intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the
communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent
to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of commit-
ting any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States or of any state.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1988).
10. Munroe, supra note 4, at 12-13.
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may serve to impose civil or criminal liability on unknowing employers
who electronically monitor employee actions."
Illegal electronic monitoring constitutes a felony punishable by impris-
onment for up to five years. 2 Section 2520 of Title III also creates a
private right of action for injured parties."3 Moreover, a court may re-
quire an employer engaging in illegal monitoring to pay damages to each
party to the conversation. 14
In addition to the legal exposure posed by the federal wiretapping stat-
utes, state surveillance statues also regulate electronic monitoring. Based
on the legislative history of Title III, courts have consistently held that
state statutes may impose more restrictive provisions than those con-
tained in Title III.1" Only seven states have refused to enact statutes
regulating electronic surveillance.' 6 Consequently, a regional or national
corporation that engages in employee monitoring could comply with fed-
11. See id. at 11 ("An employer must, therefore, traverse a legal mine filed in order to benefit
from the advantages of commercial electronic surveillance.").
12. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a) (1988). First offenders who do not monitor for a tortious or illegal
purpose or for commercial advantage or private commercial gain are subjected to either: (1) a fine of
$500; or (2) imprisonment for one year and/or a statutory fine. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(b) (1988).
There is a mandatory statutory fine of $500 for second offenders. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(5)(a)(ii)(B)
(1988).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided in section 251 l(2Xa)(ii), any person whose wire, oral, or electronic
communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter
may in a civil action recover from the person or entity which engaged in that violation such
relief as may be appropriate.
18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (1988).
Under § 2520, appropriate relief includes: equitable relief, damages, punitive damages in an ap-
propriate case, and reasonable attorneys' fees. The statutory damages are computed by assessing the
greater of $100 a day for each day of violation or a lump sum of $10,000. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b), (c)
(1988).
14. See, eg., Deal v. Spears, 780 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Ark. 1991) (finding the two defendant-
employers liable for statutory damages to both parties to the monitored conversations and mandat-
ing that each defendant pay each conversant $10,000).
15. See, eg., Navarra v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 510 F. Supp 831, 833 (E.D. Mich.
1981). "The state statute must meet the minimum standards reflected as a whole in the proposed
chapter. The proposed provision envisions that [s]tates would be free to adopt more restrictive legis-
lation, or no legislation at all, but not less restrictive legislation." Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1097, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2187).
16. The following states have not enacted wiretapping statutes: Alabama, Arkansas, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Montana, Tennessee, South Carolina and Vermont. Although South Carolina does
not have a law generally prohibiting wiretapping, one South Carolina statute does regulate pen regis-
ters and trap devices. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-29-10 to 17-29-50 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
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eral law but, at the same time, violate state law. 17
Despite the existence of federal and state regulatory statutes, estimates
suggest that employers currently monitor sixty-six percent of the com-
puterized workforce."8 In response to this evidence of pervasive monitor-
ing in the work place, Congress recently introduced the Privacy for
Consumers and Workers Act.19 The drafters of this legislation intended
the proposed Act "to prevent potential abuses of electronic monitoring"
in the work place.2'
Neither the proposed Act nor existing state or federal wiretapping leg-
islation effectively satisfies the needs of both employers and employees.
This Note argues that legislation granting employees affirmative rights in
the work place will strike a better balance between employer and em-
ployee interests. Part I discusses the business-extension exception to Ti-
tle III. Part II analyzes the consent exception to Title III. Part III
examines the pertinent sections of the proposed Privacy for Consumers
and Workers Act. Part IV criticizes Title III and the proposed Privacy
for Consumers and Workers Act. Finally, Part V proposes federal regu-
lation for employee monitoring in the work place.
I. THE BUSINESS-EXTENSION EXCEPTION
The business-extension exception arises from Title III's section
2510(5)(a). This section permits the interception of a communication
where telephones or electronic communications systems used in the ordi-
nary course of business serve as the intercepting device.2" This exception
does not require employee consent if the employer meets the statutory
17. Munroe, supra note 4, at 12. In addition, an employer doing business in more than one
state could engage in conduct that is sanctioned by one state, but prohibited by another state. Id.
18. The Privacy for Consumers and Workers: Hearings on H.R. 1218, Act Before the Subcomm.
on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
2 (1991) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 1218] (statement of Hon. Pat Williams, Chairman) (citing
statistics compiled by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health).
19. Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) introduced the Senate version of the Privacy for Consumers and
Workers Act, S. 516, on February 27, 1991. Representative Pat Williams (D-MT) introduced the
House version, H.R. 1218, on February 28, 1991.
20. H.R. 1218, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter H.R. 1218].
21. See supra note 9. Under Title III as enacted in 1968, the business-extension exception
would not apply unless a communications common carrier furnished the telephone equipment to the
subscriber. In 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and
amended § 2510(5)(a) to include equipment furnished by "a provider of wire or electronic communi-
cations services." Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 101(c)(4),
100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) (1988)).
[Vol. 70:853
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requirements of section 2510(5)(a).2 2 The business-extension exception,
which originated in an early draft of Title III, contained a blanket excep-
tion for extension telephones.23 Originally, Congress did not intend to
regulate a normal extension telephone under Title 111.24 The version of
Title III that Congress finally enacted expanded the exception to include
"any telephone or telegraph instrument," but limited the exception's ap-
plication to interceptions made in the ordinary course of business. 25 This
limitation, coupled with the requirement that the employer use a "tele-
phone or telegraph instrument" to monitor the work place, forms the
basis of the business-extension exception.26
A. Type of Intercept
The business-extension exception only applies when the intercepting
device utilized is telegraph or telephone equipment.2 7 Originally, Title
III protected only wire and oral communications from unauthorized in-
terception. 28 However, advances in communications technology limited
the applicability of Title III. Consequently, in 1986, Congress amended
the statute by enacting the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
which brought electronic communications within the category of pro-
22. See Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., Inc., 630 F.2d 414, 419 (5th Cir. 1980) ("To hold
that a business extension telephone is afn] [electronic] 'device' unless it is used with the consent of
one of the parties to the conversation would be to read the extension telephone exception out of the
law, because 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2Xd) makes clear that interception is generally not unlawful if one of
the parties to the communication has authorized the interception... We do not believe Congress
intended the exception to be superfluous ... ").
23. Id. at 418. The earlier draft of the bill stated: 'The term 'electronic, mechanical or other
device' does not include.., an extension telephone instrument furnished to the subscriber or user by
a communications common carrier in the ordinary course of its business." Id. (citing H.R. 5470,
90th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2515(dXl) (1967), reprinted in Hearings on the Anti-Crime Program Before
the Subcomm. No. 5 of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 892, 894 (1967)).
24. 630 F.2d at 418.
25. Id. Congress probably offered this limitation on the blanket exception in response to the
testimony of Professor Herman Schwartz, who appeared before the House Judiciary Committee on
behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union. Professor Schwartz testified that extension telephones
could be used to invade someone's privacy. Id. (citing H.R. 5470, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2515(d)(1)
(1967), reprinted in Hearings on the Anti-Crime Program Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 892, 894 (1967)).
26. Section 2510(5)(a) of Title III only exempts "any telephone or telegraph instrument, equip-
ment or facility, or any component thereof..." from the prohibition on wiretapping. See supra note
9.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1982), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1986).
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tected communications.29 Congress intended the Electronic Communi-
cations Privacy Act to bridge the gap between the 1968 Act and the
development of new communications technology. 30 As amended, Title
III now affords protection to any transfer of data by wire, radio or other
electronic means.
3 1
Although Title III prohibits unauthorized interception of electronic,
oral and wire communications, the business-extension exception specifies
that telephone or telegraph equipment must act as the intercepting de-
vice.32 Courts have interpreted this language broadly to include a variety
of communications systems. 33 Moreover, courts have held that where an
employer records rather than monitors a particular telephone call, the
telephone intercepts the call, not the recording device.34  Although a re-
29. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 101, 100 Stat.
1848-53 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1988)).
30. S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555 [hereinafter
1986 Senate Report].
31. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1988). Specifically, advanced technological methods of communica-
tion now encompassed within the scope of Title III include: digital communications, data communi-
cations, video communications, electronic mail and communications via fiberoptic cable. Russell S.
Burnside, Note, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986: The Challenge of Applying
Ambiguous Statutory Language to Intricate Telecommunication Technologies, 13 RUTGERS COM-
PUTER & TECH. L.J. 451 (1987). Primarily, electronic communications were outside the scope of
Title III prior to 1986 because Title III required that there be an aural interception in order to
establish a violation. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1982) (amended 1986). The 1986 Act merely
amended the definition of "intercept" to include an "aural or other acquisition." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(4) (1988).
32. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
33. An emergency dispatch console is an example of such a communication device. The con-
sole is a monitoring device placed on the phone by a telephone company and a police station tele-
phone system.
In Epps v. St. Mary's Hosp., the Eleventh Circuit held that the statutory exception included an
emergency dispatch console. 802 F.2d 412, 415 (1lth Cir. 1986). Defendants monitored the tele-
phone call in question by using an extension line of the hospital's dispatch console which the hospital
used to receive emergency calls and dispatch emergency services. Id. at 413. The Epps court held
that the dispatch console clearly fell within the statutory requirement. Id. at 415.
In James v. Newspaper Agency Corp., the Tenth Circuit held that the business-extension excep-
tion applied where the employer requested that the telephone company install a monitoring system
to permit the supervisors to monitor employees. 591 F.2d 579, 581 (10th Cir. 1979).
In Jandak v. Village of Brookfield, 520 F. Supp. 815 (N.D. Ill. 1981), the court held that the
exception included routine recording of emergency calls on a police station telephone system. Id. at
822.
34. See Royal Health Care Servs. v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins., 924 F.2d 215, 217 (11th Cir. 1991)
(holding that under the Florida business-extension exception (which is identical to Title III's busi-
ness-extension exception codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)) the telephone extension is the device
that intercepts the call because it can intercept a call without recording the call); Epps, 802 F.2d at
415 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (holding that the dispatch console was the intercepting device rather than the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss3/6
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cording device does not qualify for the statutory exception, if the em-
ployer connects the recording device to a telephone outlet, then the
interception will fall within the exception. 5
B. Ordinary Course of Business
An employer must intercept a communication in the ordinary course
of business to fall within the business-extension exception. The legisla-
tive history of Title III provides no guidance as to what Congress in-
tended by the "ordinary course of business" limitation.36 Courts differ
over the interpretation of the "ordinary course of business" clause with
respect to two issues: surreptitious monitoring and monitoring personal
telephone calls in the work place.
In United States v. Harpel,37 the Tenth Circuit held that surreptitious
monitoring violated the purpose of Title III and therefore did not fall
within the ordinary course of business.38 In Harpel, while at a local bar,
a police officer played an unauthorized tape recording of a conversation
between another police officer and a federal agent. 39 The Tenth Circuit
double reel tape recorder used to record the telephone calls); United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346,
350 (10th Cir. 1974) ("[Ihe recording of a conversation is immaterial when the overhearing is itself
legal. . It is the receiver which services this function [intercepting] - the recorder is a mere acces-
sory designed to preserve the contents of the communication.").
35. See Abel v. Bonfanti, 625 F. Supp. 263, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that the means of
intercepting a communication are irrelevant as long as the employer attaches the device to an exten-
sion phone outlet, and intercepts the call in the ordinary course of business).
36. Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 1980). The Senate Report
omitted the business-extension exception from the list of exceptions outlined in the report. Id. at 414
(citing S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153).
37. 493 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1974).
38. Id. at 351. However, the Tenth Circuit includes non-surreptitious monitoring within the
ordinary course of business exception. In James v. Newspaper Agency Corp., the court held that
non-surreptitious employee monitoring with prior written notice to employees falls within the em-
ployer's ordinary course of business. 591 F.2d 579, 581 (10th Cir. 1979). In James, the employer
requested that the telephone company install a monitoring device to allow supervisors to train and
instruct employees in dealing with the general public. Id. The monitoring was not surreptitious,
and the employers provided the employees with advance notice of the policy. Id. In addition, the
monitoring system protected employees from abusive telephone calls. Id. Concluding that the mon-
itoring occurred in the ordinary course of business, the court also recognized the legitimate purposes
for monitoring. Id.
39. 493 F.2d at 348. This case arose under the criminal provisions of Title III. Harpel was
convicted of disclosing an unlawfully intercepted wire or oral communication in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 251 l(l)(c). Id. Under this section, it is unlawful to disclose intentionally, or endeavor to
disclose, the contents of any intercepted conversation where the party knows or has reason to know
that the information was obtained through a violation of the wiretapping laws. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(l)(c) (1988).
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held that unauthorized use of a telephone extension to surreptitiously
monitor a private telephone conversation is not in the ordinary course of
business.4
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit, in Briggs v. American Air Filter Co. , '
held that under certain circumstances the ordinary course of business
exception encompasses surreptitious monitoring. In Briggs, a supervisor
suspected that an employee was discussing confidential business matters
during a telephone call to a competitor.4 2 The supervisor listened and
recorded part of the telephone call using the extension telephone in his
office.43 The court ruled that the supervisor monitored the call during
the ordinary course of business, because the supervisor had specific suspi-
cions regarding the employee's conduct and listened only long enough to
confirm his suspicions.' However, the court specifically declined to de-
cide whether the ordinary course of business exception supported a gen-
eral policy of surreptitious monitoring or authorized the interception of
personal telephone calls.45
In 1983, in Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co. ,46 the Eleventh Circuit be-
came the first circuit court to consider whether the ordinary course of
business exception permitted the interception of personal telephone calls.
The court stated that although a business call is conclusively within the
ordinary course of business exception, a personal call only qualified for
the exception to the extent necessary to guard against unauthorized use
of the telephone.47 The court defined a business call as a telephone con-
versation in which the employer had a legal interest.48 In Watkins, a
supervisor intercepted an employee's telephone call in which the em-
40. 493 F.2d at 351. See Burnside, supra note 31, at 487 n.239. See also Campiti v. Walonis,
611 F.2d 387, 392 n.5 (1st Cir. 1979) (recognizing that "[tihe Senate Report declares that Title III
created a flat ban on all unauthorized electronic surveillance," notwithstanding the extension tele-
phone exception).
41. 630 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1980).
42. Id. at 416. Specifically, the supervisor suspected that the employee was disclosing the em-
ployer's job bid which the employer expected to submit the following day. Id.
43. Id. The supervisor recorded the call by using an attachment to a dictating machine. Id.
44. Id. at 420. The court declined to comment on the legality of the interception had the
supervisor continued to intercept the entire telephone call. Id.
45. Id. The plaintiffs stipulated that the telephone call in question was a business rather than a
personal call. Therefore, the court noted that it did not need to decide whether the ordinary course
of business exception could ever include the interception of a personal telephone call. Id.
46. 704 F.2d 577 (1lth Cir. 1983).
47. Id. at 582-83.
48. Id. at 582.
[Vol. 70:853
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ployee discussed alternative employment opportunities.4 9 The court held
that the employee's telephone conversation constituted a purely personal
call because the employer had no legal interest in the employee's future
plans to interview for other employment positions.5" Therefore, the
court concluded that the employee's personal telephone call did not fall
within the employer's ordinary course of business.5"
Only three years later, the Eleventh Circuit applied the standard
adopted in Watkins in Epps v. St. Mary's Hospital of Athens, Inc. ,52 and
held that an employer has a legal interest in maintaining the job environ-
ment.53 In Epps, a hospital employee overheard two other employees
criticize hospital supervisors while speaking on the hospital's internal tel-
ephone line.54 The employee recorded the conversation on the system
used to record incoming emergency calls.55 The Epps court determined
that the telephone call was a business call because the call occurred dur-
ing business hours, between employees, and concerned criticism of the
employee's supervisors in a business capacity.56 The court found that the
employer had a legal interest in preventing contamination of the work
place.57 Thus, the court concluded that the call fell within the ordinary
course of business exception.58
49. Id. at 579.
50. Id. at 582.
51. Id. The Watkins court stated that it could not expand "the phrase 'in the ordinary course
of business' to mean anything that interests a company" because such a broad interpretation of the
exception would "flout the words of the statute." Id. Further, the court acknowledged that if a
situation ever existed in which an employer could monitor a personal call, then this constituted such
a case because the employee discussed matters of great interest to the employer. Id. at 583. How-
ever, the court concluded that it is unacceptable to formulate a rule including the interception of
personal telephone calls within the ordinary course of business. Id.
52. 802 F.2d 412 (11th Cir. 1986).
53. Id. at 416-17.
54. Id. at 413.
55. Id. at 413-14. The employee testified that she did not listen to the conversation as she
recorded it. Id. at 418. Applying the business-extension exception to unauthorized monitoring by
an employee, the Eleventh Circuit implicitly held that surreptitious monitoring may fall within the
ordinary course of business.
56. Id. at 417.
57. Id. at 416-17.
58. Id. The dissent, however, argued that the majority incorrectly relied on the Watkins deci-
sion. Id. at 417. Watkins held that intercepting a call that is merely related to business does not
advance a legitimate business purpose. Id. (citing Watkins, 704 F.2d at 582). The dissent stated
that in this case no legitimate business purpose existed for the interception at the time the eavesdrop-
ping employee recorded the call. Epps, 802 F.2d at 418. Moreover, the dissent argued that an
eavesdropper cannot evade the federal wiretapping provisions by claiming that her employer might
be interested in the gossip of its employees. Id. The dissent reasoned that his interpretation of the
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II. THE CONSENT EXCEPTION
Section 2511(2)(d) of Title III provides that a person not acting under
color of law may intercept a communication where the person is either a
party to the conversation, or where one of the parties to the conversation
has given prior consent to the interception.5 9 Under the consent excep-
tion, an employer may monitor the communications of employees who
have given "prior consent" to the interception.' Beyond indicating that
consent may be express or implied, the legislative history offers little indi-
cation of the intended scope of "prior consent."61 Courts disagree, how-
ever, on the extent to which a court should infer consent in a case lacking
the presence of express consent. 62 Moreover, in adopting a case-by-case
approach, courts have failed to establish a framework for evaluating the
scope of consent.63
In Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co. ,4 the Eleventh Circuit narrowly inter-
preted the scope of both express and implied consent. In Watkins, an
employee brought a Title III suit against her employer for wrongfully
intercepting a personal telephone call.6" The employee consented to the
employer's policy of generally monitoring business calls, but only moni-
toring personal telephone calls to the extent necessary to ensure that a
record suggested that the eavesdropper fished for material that he could use to fire the two parties to
the conversation. Id. The wiretapping statute "does not immunize busybodies and malicious gos-
sips." Id.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1988). An employer invokes the consent exception by requiring
employees to sign a consent form which indicates that the employee is consenting to the interception
of communications by someone not a party to the conversation.
60. The first clause of § 2511(2)(d), which allows a party to a conversation to monitor the
conversation, does not apply in the situation of an employer monitoring an employee. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(2)(d) (1988).
61. The legislative history notes that "[s]urveillance devices in banks or apartment houses for
institutional or personal protection would be impliedly consented to." 1968 Senate Report, supra
note 6, at 2182.
62. The legislative history of Title III indicates that the consent exception merely reflects prior
existing law. The legislative history demonstrates an assumption that consent of one party will miti-
gate any interception of a wire, oral or electronic communication. Id. The paucity of legislative
history regarding the consent exception as applied in the workplace is attributable to the primary
purpose of Title III. Congress intended Title III to regulate the use of wiretapping and electronic
surveillance in the administration of justice. Id. at 2113.
63. Munroe, supra note 4, at 12 ("The primary lesson of Watkins is that every interception will
be evaluated separately to determine whether consent was obtained.").
64. 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983).
65. Id. at 579. The supervisor monitored a telephone call in which the employee discussed an
employment interview with another company and indicated a strong interest in accepting a position
with that company. Id.
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particular conversation was a personal call.66 The Watkins court noted
that the employee did not expressly consent to the monitoring of her
personal call by the employer because she only consented to the limited
monitoring of her business calls.6 7 The court held that Title III did not
preclude the employee from limiting the extent of her consent.6" The
court concluded that the trier of fact must determine whether the scope
of the employee's consent encompassed the particular monitored call at
* 69issue.
In the absence of express consent, the Watkins court considered
whether an employee could imply consent. The employer argued that
the employee impliedly consented to the interception by accepting em-
ployment after receiving actual notice of the monitoring policy.7" The
Eleventh Circuit concluded that "consent under Title III is not to be
cavalierly implied."71 Consequently, the court held that an employee's
mere knowledge of an employer's monitoring capability does not consti-
tute implied consent.72
Declining to follow Watkins, the Second Circuit, in United States v.
Amen," held that the legislative history of Title III indicates that Con-
gress intended courts to interpret the consent exception broadly.74 In
Amen, two inmates argued that they did not consent to the monitoring of
their telephone calls by prison officials, even though all of the inmates
received notice of monitoring.75 The Amen court concluded that if a
66. Id. Berry Company's business consisted primarily of telephone solicitation. Id. The com-
pany hired and trained Watkins to solicit current and prospective advertisers by telephone. Berry
Company monitored the telephone solicitation calls as part of its employee training program. Id.
The calls were monitored by a standard extension telephone that was located in the supervisor's
office. The supervisor would later review monitored calls with the employee and discuss how to
improve sales techniques. Id.
67. Id. at 581. The employee consented only to the inadvertent interception of a personal call.
Watkin's supervisor disregarded this policy by intercepting a substantial portion of her conversion.
Id.
68. Id. at 582.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 581.
71. Id. The court noted that it would thwart Title III's purpose of protecting individual pri-
vacy to routinely imply consent from certain circumstances. Id.
72. Id. The court focused on the fact that Watkins relied on a scheme of limited monitoring.
Id.
73 831 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1987). The potential illegality of the interception arose in the context
of a criminal defendant's motion to suppress the wiretap evidence as unlawfully obtained. Id. at 378.
74. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2112, 2182).
75. Id. at 379. This case arose under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) rather than § 2511(2)(d). See
1992]
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party to a conversation receives actual notice of monitoring, and disre-
garding that notice places a call on the monitored telephone, then he is
deemed to have impliedly consented to the monitoring.76
In Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 77 the First Circuit followed the Second Cir-
cuit's analysis in Amen, acknowledging that Congress intended a broad
interpretation of the consent requirement. 78 The Griggs court found
that an individual implies consent where the circumstances indicate that
the party knowingly agreed to the monitoring.79 In Griggs, a tenant
claimed that he did not consent to the landlord's interception of a per-
sonal telephone call, even though the landlord repeatedly warned the ten-
ant that she recorded all incoming calls.80 The court concluded that the
tenant impliedly consented to the interception because he continued to
speak freely on the monitored telephone line even after receiving actual
notice of the landlord's monitoring.81 Declining to formulate a test for
supra note 9 for the text of § 2511(2)(d). Section 2511(2)(c) is nearly identical to § 2511(2)(d),
except that it provides a consent exception for a person acting under color of law.
Section 2511(2)(c) provides in pertinent part:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to inter-
cept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where such person is a party to the commu-
nication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such
interception.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1988).
76. 831 F.2d at 379. The court found that the inmates received actual notice of the prison's
policy of monitoring telephones from at least four sources. Id. First, the Code of Federal Regula-
tions provided that there is a possibility of monitoring prison telephones. Id. Second, upon arriving
at the prison, each inmate attended a lecture in which prison officials discussed the monitoring pol-
icy. Id. Third, each prisoner received an informational handbook containing a notice regarding the
monitoring system. Id. Finally, prison officials placed notices on each telephone. Id.
77. 904 F.2d 112 (Ist Cir. 1990).
78. Id. at 116.
79. Id. at 116-17. The court noted that circumstances relevant to determining whether implied
consent exists include language or acts which indicate that the party "knows of, or assents to, en-
croachments on the routine expectation that conversations are private." Id. at 117.
80. Id. at 114. The landlord began recording incoming calls on the advice of the police depart-
ment because she had been receiving obscene telephone calls. Id. The landlord listened to the plain-
tiff's telephone call because she believed the caller made the obscene phone calls. Id. While
listening to the conversation, the landlord began to suspect that the conversation concerned a drug
transaction. Id. She notified the authorities and the plaintiff was arrested for drug trafficking. Id.
The state superior court suppressed the recording on the ground that the plaintiff was unaware of the
landlord's monitoring practice, and therefore did not consent. Id. The plaintiff contemporaneously
filed his civil suit. Id.
81. Id. at 118. Presumably, the court based its conclusion on Griggs-Ryan's continued and
unguarded telephone conversation. During the call which the landlord intercepted, Griggs-Ryan
apparently spoke of a drug transaction. Id. at 114. He was arrested for drug trafficking because of
the information the landlord overheard. Id.
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determining implied consent, the court instead concluded that the scope
of consent depends on the particular facts of each case.
82
Both the First and Eleventh Circuit agree that the facts and circum-
stances of a case determine the extent of consent.83 The two circuits dif-
fer, however, in their application of the concept of implied consent.8"
The Griggs court cited Watkins for the proposition that a court should
not aggressively infer consent,85 but also cited Amen for the rule that a
court should interpret the consent requirement broadly.86 Clearly, how-
ever, the character of notice given to the monitored party will largely
determine whether a court chooses to infer consent.
8 7
In addition to ambiguity surrounding the scope of the consent excep-
tion, courts have struggled with the applicability of the exception in cases
involving restrictive state legislation. Under federal law, only one party
to the conversation needs to consent to the interception for the exception
to apply. Twelve states, however, require the consent of all the parties to
the conversation in order to fall within the exception. 8 Both federal and
82. Id. at 119.
83. Id. at 117. The Griggs court reconciled its holding with Watkins by concluding that in
each case, the existence or lack of consent is purely a factual question. Id.
84. Id. at 117. Watkins, 704 F.2d at 581.
85. 904 F.2d at 117. "IThe ultimate determination must proceed in light of the prophylactic
purpose of Title III-a purpose which suggests that consent should not casually be inferred." Id.
(citing Watkins, 704 F.2d at 581).
86. Id. at 116-17 ("we agree with the Second Circuit that Congress intended the consent re-
quirement to be construed broadly." (citing United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir.
1987)).
87. Compare Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 118 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Griggs-Ryan, of
course, cannot plausibly posit a claim of deficient notice... [the landlord's] blanket admonishment
left no room for plaintiff to wonder whether... the call would be intercepted.") and United States v.
Amen, 831 F.2d at 378-79 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[Defendants] were on notice of the prison's interception
policy from at least four sources... The two defendants had notice of the interception system and
that their use of the telephones therefore constituted implied consent to the monitoring.") with
Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387, 393-94 (1st Cir. 1979) (refusing to imply consent where the
inmates in a prison were not given notice that the calls could be monitored); Watkins v. L.M. Berry
& Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581 (11th Cir. 1983) ("[K]nowledge of the capability of monitoring alone
cannot be considered implied consent.") and Crooker v. United States Dept. of Justice, 497 F. Supp.
500, 503 (D. Conn. 1980) (prisoner's knowledge that calls were routinely monitored did not consti-
tute consent to it).
88. California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 631(a) (West 1988); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-570(d)(a)(1) (West 1991); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335 (1975 & Supp.
1991); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(2)(d) (West 1991); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-
62(2) (Michie 1982); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4001 (1990); Maryland, MD. Cms. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402(c)(3) (1990); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 272, § 99
(West 1991); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.539c (1991); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT.
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state courts have had great difficulty in determining whether state or fed-
eral law applies.8 9 Moreover, an additional choice of law issue arises
where a person places a telephone call between two states with conflict-
ing consent exceptions.90
III. THE PROPOSED PRIVACY FOR CONSUMERS AND WORKERS ACT
In February 1991, sponsors of the proposed Privacy for Consumers
and Workers Act ("Privacy Act") introduced the bill to Congress.9" The
§ 165.540(1)(c) (1990); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5704(4) (1991); Washington,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030(1)(a) (West 1988).
89. The only two district courts to confront the choice of law question in the context of civil
cases reached opposite conclusions. In both cases, the federal one-party consent exception conflicted
with a state statute requiring consent of every party.
In Montone v. Radio Shack, the court viewed the Pennsylvania wiretapping statute as a state
evidentiary law because, under the statute, a victim of unlawful wiretapping may move to suppress
the contents of the interception or the evidence derived from it. 698 F. Supp. 92, 94 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit 18, § 5721 (1984). The court applied the federal rule and admitted
the evidence. The court admitted it because, in a diversity case, the court must follow federal evi-
dentiary law, unless one of the Federal Rules of Evidence specifically invokes state law. Montone,
698 F. Supp. at 93.
In contrast, in Navarra v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., the court held that the state had
expressed a clear and unambiguous intent to provide additional protection for the privacy of its
citizens, and therefore, no evidence obtained from wiretapping could be admitted without consent of
all the parties. 510 F. Supp. 831, 836 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
State courts have also had difficulty determining the applicable law. In Hirschey v. Menlow, the
Oregon Court of Appeals applied the one-party consent exception embodied in § 2511(2)(d) of Title
III. 747 P.2d 402, 404 (Or. Ct. App. 1987). The court noted that § 251 l(2)(d) also requires that the
employer not intercept the communication "for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious
act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state." Id. Concluding
that a violation of the Oregon statute requiring consent of every party constituted a criminal or
tortious act for the purpose of § 251 l(2)(d), the court held that under Title III, the interception did
not fall within the exception. Id. at 405.
In Jewelcor v. Pre-Fab Panelwall, Inc., the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that where conver-
sations occur between people in different states, § 2511(2)(d) of Title III preempts state law. 579
A.2d 940 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
90. In United States v. Nelson, the Eleventh Circuit held that the definition of "the term 'inter-
cept' as it relates to 'aural acquisition' refers to the place in which the communication is obtained
regardless of where the communication is ultimately heard." 837 F.2d 1519, 1527 (1Ith Cir. 1988).
Therefore, under Nelson, the location of the intercept determines the applicable law. However, the
definition of "intercept" under state law is not always identical to the definition of "intercept" under
Title III. See Munroe, supra note 4, at 12.
91. Representative Pat Williams of Montana introduced the bill to the House of Representa-
tives on February 28, 1991. 137 CONG. REc. H1325 (1991). Currently, the bill has a total of 131 co-
sponsors: 119 Democrats and 12 Republicans. 137 CONG. REc. H11891 (1991).
Senator Paul Simon of Illinois introduced the bill to the Senate on February 27, 1991. 137 CONo.
REC. S2404 (1991). To date, the bill has one co-sponsor in the Senate. 137 CONO. REC. S4063
(1991).
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purpose of the bill is to "prevent potential abuses of electronic monitor-
ing in the workplace." 92 Under the Privacy Act, "electronic monitoring"
encompasses all data collection by any technological device, excluding
only wiretapping and the electronic transfer of payroll information.93
The proposed legislation regulates any individual, business entity, or gov-
ernmental body which has employees. 94 If enacted, the legislation will
severely impact employers who engage in electronic monitoring by estab-
lishing specific guidelines for legal monitoring.
Under the proposed Act, an employer must comply with five require-
ments before instituting or maintaining an electronic monitoring system.
First, a monitoring employer must post a notice of electronic monitoring
on its premises in a conspicuous place.95 Second, the employer must pro-
vide specific information to each monitored employee including the type
of monitoring device, the type of data collected, the frequency with
which monitoring will occur, and how the employer will use the data to
evaluate performance.96 However, the employer does not have to pro-
92. H.R. 1218, supra note 20.
93. Section 2(1) provides:
(1) ELECTRONIC MONITORING. -
(A) IN GENERAL. - Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the term "electronic mon-
itoring" means the collection, storage, analysis, or reporting of information concerning an
employee's activities by means of a computer, electronic observation and supervision, tele-
phone service observation, telephone call accounting, or other form of visual, auditory, or
computer-based technology which is conducted by any method other than direct observa-
tion by another person, including the following methods: Transfer of signs, signals, writ-
ing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature which are transmitted in part by a
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photo-optical system....
(C) EXCLUSION. - The term "electronic monitoring" does not include-
(i) wiretapping, or
(ii) the electronic transfer of payroll and other payroll-related information for payroll
purposes only.
H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 2(IXA).
94. H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 2(3).
95. Section 3(a)(1) provides:
(a) IN GENERAL. -
(1) FIRST NOTICE. - The Secretary [of Labor] shall prepare, have printed, and dis-
tribute to employers a notice which will inform employees-
(A) that an employer engages in or may engage in electronic monitoring of employees and
specifies the circumstances (including monitoring described in paragraph (3)) under which
an employee is or is not entitled to additional notice under this section, and
(B) of the rights and protections provided to employees by this Act.
[With the exception of the 90 days immediately following enactment], each employer who
engages in electronic monitoring shall post and maintain such notice in conspicuous places
on its premises where notices to employees are customarily posted.
H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 3(a)(1).
96. Section 3(a)(2) provides in pertinent part:
(2) SPECIFIC NOTICE.... [I]f an employer proposes to engage in electronic monitoring
Washington University Open Scholarship
868 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 70:853
vide specific notice where the employer has a reasonable suspicion that
an employee is engaging in criminal conduct which will adversely affect
the employer's interests.97 Third, the employer must notify prospective
employees of the monitoring practice at the job applicant's initial inter-
view.98 Fourth, an employer who only periodically monitors conversa-
tions must install a device which alerts employees each time the
employer monitors.99 Similarly, where an employer continuously
monitors employees, but only sporadically reviews the data during the
monitoring, the employer must alert employees each time it reviews the
data.1" Finally, an employer who tests the quality of customer service
of an employee, the employer shall provide such employee with prior written notice
describing the following regarding the electronic monitoring of the employee:
(A) The forms of electronic monitoring to be used.
(B) The personal data to be collected.
(C) The frequency of each form of electronic monitoring which will occur.
(D) The use to be made of personal data collected.
(E) Interpretation of printouts of statistics or other records of information collected
through electronic monitoring.
(F) Existing production standards and work performance expectations.
(G) Methods for determining production standards and work performance expectations
based on electronic monitoring statistics.
H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 3(a)(2).
97. Section 3(a)(3) provides:
(3) EXCEPTIONS TO NOTICE REQUIREMENT.-
(A) SPECIAL MONITORING.- If an employer has a reasonable suspicion that an em-
ployee is engaged in conduct which
(i) violates criminal or civil law, and
(ii) adversely affects the employer's interests or the interests of such employer's employ-
ees, and if the employer engages in electronic monitoring of such conduct, the employer is
not required to provide the employee with the notice prescribed by paragraph (2).
H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 3(a)(3).
98. Section 3(a)(4) provides:
(4) NOTICE TO PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYEES.-
(A) IN GENERAL.- Each employer shall notify a prospective employee at the first per-
sonal interview of existing forms of electronic monitoring conducted by the employer
which may affect the prospective employee if such employee is hired by the employer.
(B) SPECIFIC NOTICE.- Each employer, upon request by a prospective employee or
when the employer offers employment to a prospective employee, shall provide the pro-
spective employee with the written notice described in [§ 3(2)] regarding existing forms of
electronic monitoring conducted by the employer which may affect the prospective em-
ployee is such employee is hired by the employer.
H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 3(a)(4).
99. Section 3(a)(5) provides in pertinent part:
(5) NOTICE OF PERIODIC OR RANDOM MONITORING.... [A]ny employer who
conducts electronic monitoring of an employee on a periodic or random basis shall provide
the employee with a simultaneous notice in the form of a signal light, beeping tone, verbal
notification, or other form of visual or aural notice that indicates electronic monitoring is
being conducted.
H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 3(a)(5).
100. Section 3(a)(6) provides in pertinent part:
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by monitoring employee telephone calls must use a device which notifies
the customer that the employer is listening to the conversation. 101
Additional provisions of the proposed legislation severely restrict the
employer's ability to utilize information obtained through electronic
monitoring. Under the Act, an employer may not evaluate work per-
formance or set production goals or quotas solely on the basis of infor-
mation acquired by monitoring employee actions. 0 2 Moreover, not only
does the Act strictly limit the type of information an employer may col-
lect through electronic monitoring, but it also regulates the employer's
disclosure of this information. 103 The Act also contains other require-
(6) NOTICE OF REVIEW OF CONTINUOUS ELECTRONIC MONITORING.-
(A) REVIEW DURING MONITORING.-
(i) IN GENERAL.- Except as provided in... clause (ii), any employer who reviews
data, obtained by continuous electronic monitoring of the employer's employees, on a peri-
odic or random basis while the monitoring is being conducted shall provide the employee
with a simultaneous notice in the form of a signal light, beeping tone, verbal notification, or
other form of visual or aural notice that indicates the electronic monitoring is being re-
viewed.
(ii) The review of electronic data obtained from the use of an electronic card access
system and the review of data appearing simultaneously on multiple television screens are
not subject to clause (i).
(B) REVIEW AFTER MONITORING.- An employer may review data obtained by
continuous electronic monitoring of the employer's employees after the monitoring was
completed only if review was limited to specific data which the employer has reason to
believe contains information relevant to an employee's work.
H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 3(aX6).
101. Section 3(b) provides in pertinent part:
(b) CUSTOMER NOTICE.- . . . [I1f an employer engages in telephone service observa-
tion, the employer shall provide the customer who is [the] subject of the observation with a
simultaneous notice in the form of a signal light, beeping tone, verbal notification, or other
form of visual or aural notice, at periodic intervals, indicating that telephone service obser-
vation is taking place.
H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 3(b).
102. Section 6(b) provides:
(b) DATA SHALL NOT BE USED AS SOLE BASIS FOR EVALUATION OR PRO-
DUCTION QUOTAS.-An employer shall not use personal data obtained by electronic
monitoring as-
(1) the sole basis for individual employee performance evaluation, or
(2) the sole basis for setting production quotas or work performance expectations.
H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 6(b).
103. Under § 5 of the Act, an employer may only intentionally collect information related to an
employee's work performance. However, the Act does not prohibit inadvertent monitoring of infor-
mation unrelated to an employee's work performance or the collection of data unrelated to an em-
ployee's work performance. H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 5(a).
An employer may only disclose information obtained by monitoring to: (1) the affected employee;
(2) officers and supervisors who have a legitimate need for the information; (3) law enforcement
agencies in conjunction with a criminal matter; or (4) pursuant to a court order. H.R. 1218, supra
note 20, § 5(b)(1).
The employer may disclose information if it contains evidence of illegal conduct by a public offi-
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ments which further protect the employee's interests.104
The proposed Act and Title III provide similar remedies to an em-
ployee. Any employee affected by a violation of the Act may bring a
private civil action against the employer for appropriate relief including
reinstatement, promotion, lost wages and benefits.105 Additionally, the
Secretary of Labor may initiate an action to enjoin violations of the Act
or assess a civil penalty of $10,000 per violation.10 6
IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE TITLE III EXCEPTIONS AND THE
PROPOSED PRIVACY FOR CONSUMERS AND WORKERS ACT
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act only indi-
rectly governs employee monitoring through its total ban on the intercep-
tion of wire, oral and electronic communications.107 Congress did not
design Title III to regulate the conduct of employers, but rather intended
the legislation to balance the privacy expectations of the individual
against the legitimate needs of law enforcement agencies.108 Conse-
quently, Title III fails to address the discrete problem of electronic moni-
toring in the work place.109
cial or if nondisclosure would result in "a direct and substantial effect on public health or safety."
However, the employer must notify the employee before proceeding with the disclosure. If the em-
ployee objects, the employer must obtain a court's permission before disclosing the information.
H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 5(b)(2).
104. For example, § 4 requires an employer to provide an employee with the opportunity to
review all personal data gathered by electronic means. Section 5(c) prohibits an employer from
monitoring restrooms, locker rooms or dressing rooms in the absence of suspected criminal activity.
Section 6(a) restrains an employer from taking any action against an employee, unless the employer
has satisfied the provisions of the Act regarding notice and the type of the information collected.
H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 6(a).
105. Section 7(c) provides in pertinent part:
(c) PRIVATE CIVIL ACTIONS.-
(1) IN GENERAL.- An employer who violates this Act shall be liable to the employee
or prospective employee affected by such violation. Such employer shall be liable for such
legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate, including employment, reinstatement, pro-
motion, and the payment of lost wages and benefits.
H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 7(c).
Section 8 of the Act prohibits an employer from taking any retaliatory action against an employee
who brings a private civil action pursuant to § 7(c). H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 8.
106. H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 7(a).
107. Prior to 1986, Title III protected wire and oral communications, but did not regulate the
use of electronic or computerized monitoring. In 1986, Congress amended Title III to cover all
electronic communications, thus bringing computerized monitoring within its protection. See supra
notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
108. 1986 Senate Report, supra note 30, at 3559.
109. Current law does not provide an effective balance between employer and employee rights.
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A. Ineffective Regulation of Work Place Electronic Monitoring under
Title III
Under Title III, Congress provided two narrow exceptions to the gen-
eral prohibition against electronic surveillance: the consent exception
and the business-extension exception."1 Even though an employer must
fall within one of these exceptions to legally intercept any electronic com-
munication, government officials estimate that the nation's employers
monitor approximately six million workers."'
Although Title III affords litigants a private right of action against an
employer who unlawfully intercepts employee communications, employ-
ees have rarely challenged their employer's monitoring practices in
court. 11 2 Attempting to explain this phenomenon, the Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment has suggested that the inadequacy of current legal reme-
dies explains the paucity of lawsuits.' 3
For example, the business-extension exception fails to effectively regu-
late the relationship between employers and employees. Specifically, un-
resolved ambiguities regarding the coverage of the exception expose the
employer to significant and unforeseen legal liability, and also hinder the
employee's ability to bring a successful civil action." 4 Because it is diffi-
cult to predict how a court will interpret the extent of the exception,
employers who engage in electronic monitoring expose themselves to
substantial liability. Employees who institute civil lawsuits may fail to
recover because of a court's misguided reading of the exception.1
See Hearings on H.R. 1218, supra note 18, at 74 (testimony of Lewis Maltby, Director, ACLU
National Task Force on Workplace Rights, and Janlori Goldman, Director, ACLU Project on Pri-
vacy and Technology) ("Employers need information about job performance, but that need must be
balanced against employees' reasonable expectations of privacy. Unfortunately, current law does not
strike such a balance. In fact, it does not even attempt to strike a balance.").
110. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. See also, OTA Report, supra note 1, at 109.
Ill. See OTA Report, supra note I, at 5.
112. Id. at 22.
113. The small number of lawsuits also supports the conclusion that Congress cannot assess the
type of legal inadequacies in the current law until the judiciary acts. Id. This conclusion, however,
clearly illustrates the need for swift congressional action. If employers monitor 6,000,000 workers,
but few employees pursue legal remedies because of the inadequacy of the existing law, the judiciary
will not have the opportunity to act because few cases will come before the courts. If Congress stalls
and waits for the judiciary to act, an eternal holding pattern will likely result.
114. See Munroe, supra note 4, at 11.
115. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. Employers found liable in an action under
Title III are subject to substantial monetary penalties. In 1986, Congress amended the provisions of
Title III governing criminal sanctions and civil damages. Currently, the maximum statutory crimi-
nal penalty is $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations. In addition, Congress in-
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In particular, the rapid rate of technological advancement has ren-
dered the business-extension exception largely inapplicable. When Con-
gress amended Title III in 1986 to encompass all electronic
communications, Congress did not amend the language of the business-
extension exception.1 16 By definition, the business-extension exception
only provides a safe harbor to employers where a telephone or telegraph
instrument is the device used to intercept the communication.' 17 The
amendments enacted in 1986 failed to address whether the exception will
provide a safe harbor when an employer utilizes an electronic monitoring
device as the intercepting device. 18 Therefore, communications inter-
cepted through the use of a computer program may fall outside the busi-
ness-extension exception because Congress did not include a computer
program in the statute's definition of a telephone or telegraph
instrument. 1 19
Nevertheless, many employers engage in covert, nonconsensual moni-
toring by the use of computerized equipment, such as advanced com-
puter software.1 20  For example, a new software package called "Peek
creased civil statutory damages to $10,000 per violation. See also Burnside, supra note 31, at 509
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b) (Supp. 1985) and 18 U.S.C.A. § 2520 (c)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1987)).
116. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) (1988). Prior to the 1986 amendments, Title III did not encom-
pass communications between machines and computers. See Burnside, supra note 31, at 482-83.
Consequently, before 1986, Title III protected communication between two people, but did not ad-
dress the same communication when transmitted between a person and a machine or between two
machines. Id. For a discussion of the specific types of equipment encompassed by Title III follow-
ing the 1986 amendments, see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
117. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) (1988).
118. The legislative history of the 1986 amendments does not provide any guidance as to
whether Congress intended the business-extension exception only to cover telephone or telegraph
equipment. Congressional oversight may explain the failure to amend the exception.
119. Prior to the 1986 amendments, legislators generally conceded that the definition of "wire
communication" did not encompass computer technology. See S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559 ("Where are no comparable Federal statu-
tory standards to protect ... new forms of telecommunications and computer technology."). If the
broader definition of "wire communication" failed to encompass computer technology, the narrower
requirement of the business-extension exception, relating to the nature of the intercepting device,
clearly does not encompass computerized intercepting devices. The statute provides no guidance as
to whether the "telephone or telegraph component" requirement would encompass a device that
contained a telephone or telegraph component, such as an internal modem. Cf. Abel v. Bonfanti,
625 F. Supp. 263, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that as long as an intercepting device is attached to
an extension telephone outlet, the business-extension exception will apply).
120. Laura M. Litvan, Unions Fight Hightech Job Monitoring, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1990, at
Cl. See also Hearings on H. 1218, supra note 18, at 2 (statement of Rep. Pat Williams, Chairman)
("According to the May 13, 1991 issue of 'Info World,' there are currently 11 such [monitoring]
programs in existence.").
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and Spy" allows a supervisor to monitor the data appearing on an em-
ployee's computer screen at any moment in time.12 1 Courts have not yet
addressed the legality of such practices under the Title III exceptions.
However, the 1986 amendments to Title III clearly protect computer-to-
computer, or computer-to-individual, electronic communications. 22
Thus, Title III technically prohibits these computerized monitoring
programs.
Even when the business-extension exception applies, courts differ in
determining whether the interception of personal telephone calls is en-
compassed within the "ordinary course of business." In Watkins v. L.M
Berry Co. ,23 the Eleventh Circuit held that the interception of business
calls conclusively falls within the ordinary course of business, but the
exception does not apply to the monitoring of personal calls.1 24 The
Watkins court defined a business call as a conversation in which the em-
ployer had a legal interest. 125 However, only three years later, in Epps v.
St. Mary's Hospital of Athens, Inc. ,126 the same court severely manipu-
lated the Watkins court's definition of a business telephone call to in-
clude a personal telephone call in the protected business call category.127
121. Litvan, supra note 120, at C1. Other examples of computer monitoring devices include: a
trucking firm that uses computer technology to time drivers' rest stops, or software that permits a
supervisor to view an employee's daily appointment schedule without alerting that employee. Id.
122. 1986 Senate Report, supra note 30, at 3568. The legislative history states: "As a general
rule, a communication is an electronic communication protected by the federal wiretap law if it is
not carried by sound waves and cannot fairly be characterized as containing the human voice. Com-
munications consisting solely of data, for example... are electronic communications." Id.
123. 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983).
124. Id. at 583. The Watkins court specifically held that an employer may not intercept a per-
sonal call in the ordinary course of business, except to the extent necessary to determine unauthor-
ized use of the telephone. Id.
125. Id. at 582.
126. 802 F.2d 412 (11th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 867 F.2d 999 (11th Cir. 1986).
127. In Watkins, a supervisor intercepted a call in which the employee discussed alternative
employment possibilities. 704 F.2d at 579. The court held that the employer had no legal interest in
a telephone call in which an employee discussed alternative employment possibilities because the
employee was free to resign at will. Id. at 582. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. The
court concluded that the employer violated Title III when it intercepted a personal telephone call.
704 F.2d at 582.
Yet, in Epps, the Eleventh Circuit, professing to apply the legal interest test, concluded that a
telephone conversation between two employees in which they gossiped about supervisors constituted
a business call. 802 F.2d at 417. The court based this finding on the fact that the call occurred
during business hours, between employees, over a hospital extension and concerned supervisory em-
ployees. Id.
However, virtually the same facts were present in Watkins where the Eleventh Circuit held that
the conversation was a personal call. In Watkins, not only did the employee make the call during
Washington University Open Scholarship
874 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 70:853
While the holding of Watkins may appear definitive on the issue of classi-
fying a call within the ordinary course of business exception, no intelligi-
ble standard exists for determining whether a particular conversation
constitutes a personal or business call. 2 '
Finally, courts have also inconsistently answered the question of
whether surreptitious monitoring is ever encompassed within the scope
of the "ordinary course of business" requirement. The Tenth Circuit, in
United States v. Harpel,129 specifically held that to protect surreptitious
monitoring within the business-extension exception would violate the
purpose of Title 111.130 However, the Fifth Circuit, in Briggs v. American
Air Filter, Inc. ,1 held that the ordinary course of business exception
includes surreptitious monitoring if the employer limits the monitoring
in purpose and time.1 32 Some commentators suggest that Congress never
intended the business-extension exception to protect surreptitious moni-
toring if conducted through an extension telephone.1
33
The consent exception is equally ineffective in regulating the employer-
business hours, but it concerned the employee's continued employment. The court did not explain
how an employer has a greater legal interest in the gossip of an employee than the same employer
would have in the continued employment of the employee.
128. See Munroe, supra note 4, at 13. Munroe argued that Epps provided employers with some
indication of what constitutes a personal call, but employers should not interpret the case as an
automatic authorization to monitor employee gossip. Id. at 14. Munroe suggested that employers
adopt a blanket policy of not monitoring personal calls, rather than forcing a supervisor to make a
split-second decision on whether the employer has a legal interest in monitoring the call. Id.
129. 493 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1974).
130. In Harpel, the court held that surreptitious monitoring violated the privacy interests of the
individual which Congress intended to protect in enacting Title III. Id. at 351-52. See Burnside,
supra note 31, at 487 n.239.
In Campiti v. Walonis, the First Circuit also questioned the propriety of applying the business-
extension exception to cases involving covert monitoring. 611 F.2d 387 (1st Cir. 1979). The
Campiti court noted that the legislative history of Title III indicates that Congress intended to pro-
hibit all surreptitious monitoring. 611 F.2d at 392 n.5. The court relied on the Title III Senate
Report which declared a complete ban on unauthorized electronic surveillance except for surveil-
lance conducted by authorized law enforcement officers. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2113).
131. 630 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1980).
132. Id. at 420. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
133. See Burnside, supra note 31, at 488 (citing Bruce E. Fein, Regulating the Interception and
Disclosure of Wire, Radio and Oral Communication: A Case Study of Federal Statutory Antiquation,
22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 47, 92 (1985)). Burnside suggested that Congress intended the business-
extension exception to prevent the imposition of liability on an employer who inadvertently inter-
cepted a conversation through use of the equipment in the ordinary course of business. Id. at 488.
Yet, if Congress intended the business-extension exception to merely protect inadvertent intercep-
tions through extension telephones, then the types of interceptions in Watkins, Briggs and Epps
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employee relationship. Given the uncertainty regarding the scope of the
business-extension exception, many employers attempt to limit their legal
exposure by requiring an employee to consent to the monitoring before
accepting employment. 134 However, the employer may condition contin-
ued employment on the employees' acceptance of an onerous or intrusive
monitoring policy.1 35
Not only is the "prior consent" exception ineffective in protecting em-
ployee interests, but it also fails to safeguard employers from unwar-
ranted exposure to Title III civil liability. Title III only protects an
employer from liability if the employee expressly or impliedly consents to
the monitoring. 136 In Watkins v. L.M. Berry Co. ,137 the Eleventh Circuit
limited the scope of express consent by holding that consent is not an all-
or-nothing proposition.1 38  The Watkins court also held that a jury must
determine if the employee's consent encompassed the particular moni-
tored call at issue.' 39 In the context of implied consent, courts routinely
evaluate the scope of consent based on the facts of each individual
case.'" Consequently, an employer cannot effectively predict its expo-
would clearly fall outside the exception. In all three cases, the employer wilfully, rather than inad-
vertently, intercepted the call. See supra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
Burnside also argued that interpreting the business-extension exception to protect only accidental
interceptions is consistent with the Title III prohibition on willful interceptions. Burnside, supra
note 31, at 488 n.249. However, Burnside's interpretation would read the business-extension excep-
tion out of the statute. Title III only prohibits intentional interceptions. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511
(1988). Hence, an exception protecting inadvertent interceptions is useless.
134. Furfaro & Josephson, supra note 3, at 3.
135. Monitoring in the workplace raises a variety of concerns including privacy, stress and
health, worker dignity and quality of work environment. OTA Report, supra note 1, at 186-87. A
field study revealed that fairness is critical to employee acceptance of a monitoring program. Id. at
187 (citing Alan Westin & The Educational Fund for Individual Rights, Privacy and Quality of
Work Life Issues in Employee Monitoring, contractor paper prepared for OTA, May 1986 (field
study conducted during 1982-84, and updated at all 110 sites during 1985-86). If an employer can
offer continued employment to gain employee consent, then the employer does not have to institute a
fair or just monitoring policy.
136. See Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 116 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[W]e-and other courts-
have held that Title III affords safe harbor not only for persons who intercept calls with the explicit
consent of a conversant but also for those who do so after receiving implied consent.").
137. 704 F.2d 577 (1lth Cir. 1983).
138. Id. at 582.
139. Id. The Watkins court stated that the fact finder must decide the scope of the employee's
consent and then determine "whether and to what extent the interception exceeded that consent."
Id.
140. See, eg., Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 117 (Ist Cir. 1990) ("The circumstances
relevant to an implication of consent will vary from case to case."); United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d
373, 378 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1021 (1988) (implying consent from the surrounding
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sure to Title III liability.
In order to avoid a fact-specific inquiry, a prudent employer must ob-
tain the employee's express, written consent to monitor every telephone
call placed by the employee regardless of the nature of the conversa-
tion.141 As a result, an employer is precluded from implementing a mon-
itoring policy which meets the employer's specific objectives for
monitoring while minimizing the intrusion on the employees' privacy.
Judicial interpretations of the consent exception force employers to adopt
continuous or constant monitoring policies.1 42 However, constant moni-
toring detrimentally impacts the work environment because it poses a
more serious threat to the employee's mental health than periodic
monitoring.
143
Yet, an employer cannot completely avoid liability by obtaining ex-
press consent to monitor every employee phone call.' Twelve states
require that every party in the conversation consent to the monitoring. 4
Courts have struggled with choice of law questions concerning the appli-
cation of federal or state law, and the proper state law to apply in inter-
state controversies. 46 For example, regional or national companies may
engage in conduct that one state permits but another state prohibits. 47
B. The Proposed Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act: Unsuitable
Interference with the Employer's Autonomy
The proposed Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act adequately
circumstances which showed that the prisoners knowingly agreed to the prison official's
surveillance).
141. Munroe, supra note 4, at 12. Munroe noted that Watkins demonstrates that a court will
evaluate each interception separately to determine whether the interception fell within the em-
ployer's announced monitoring policy. Id. Yet, compliance with Title III does not ensure that a
court will not hold an employer liable under a more stringent state wiretapping law. See supra notes
88-90 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
143. OTA Report, supra note 1, at 96. The OTA Report recognized that the frequency of moni-
toring is an important criterion in evaluating its effects because, in addition to "continuousness" and
"regularity," an employer's frequency distinguishes spot-check monitoring for efficiency and a con-
stantly monitored work environment. Id.
144. See Munroe supra note 4, at 12 (explaining that because of inconsistencies with state legis-
lation, a company engaged in telemarketing cannot feel relieved merely because it complied with
Title III requirements).
145. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
147. See Munroe, supra note 4, at 12. Overlapping state statutes and Title III provisions further
complicate the ambiguities surrounding the two exceptions. Id.
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protects the privacy of the employee at the expense of the autonomy of
the employer. 148 First, the requirement that employers notify employees
by a beep or flashing light unduly burdens the employer's ability to pro-
vide cost-effective customer service. 149 This requirement will prohibit
the employer from accurately assessing employee performance. 150 In ad-
dition, any method of providing notice, whether by a beeping sound or
flashing light, will distract the employee from his duties long enough to
increase costs and decrease the quality of customer service. 151 Moreover,
148. The proposed Act protects the employee's privacy interest by requiring the employer to
issue specific notice of the form of monitoring used, the type of data collected and the method the
employer will use the data in evaluating performance. H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 3(a)(2). The
proposed Act requires employers to notify prospective employees of the monitoring policy. See
supra note 98. Additional protections for the employee include: a private right of action against
employers who violate the Act; a complete prohibition on monitoring in private areas, such as bath-
rooms, locker rooms; and, a "whistleblower" provision to prevent an employer from disciplining or
discharging an employee for bringing an action under the Act. See supra note 96. See also supra
notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
149. H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 3(aX5)-(6) (1991). See generally supra note 99 and accompa-
nying text.
150. See Hearings on H.R. 1218, supra note 18, at 59 (statement of Richard A. Barton, Senior
Vice President of Government Affairs, The Direct Marketing Association). "Signal lights, beep
tones or other visual or sound notices would hinder the purposes behind telephone monitoring. The
simple fact that an employee knows he or she is being monitored may change the behavior of the
employee and make it impossible to gain an accurate reading of that employee's performance." Al
Thomas M. Flood, Vice President and General Manager for Operator Services at Pacific Bell,
recognized that: "Monitoring with notice only tends to destroy the objectivity of the supervisory
monitoring sample and render monitoring, as a tool for measuring the overall service provided to the
customer, of little value. Monitoring with notice precludes management from discovering and cor-
recting unsatisfactory employee performance." Id. at 113 (statement of Thomas M. Flood).
In a written statement, the United States Telephone Association stated: "Some employees would
modify their behavior on calls when they knew they were being observed, thus spoiling the spontane-
ity that observing offers to management to determine how customers are being treated." Id. at 214
(statement of the United States Telephone Association).
151. The Direct Marketing Association contended that beep tones will likely distract and con-
fuse both employees and customers. The Association argued that aural or visual forms of notice will
jeopardize the employee's ability to perform his job accurately, thus increasing errors in customer
accounts. Id. at 59 (statement of Richard A. Barton, Senior Vice President, Government Affairs,
The Direct Marketing Association).
Thomas M. Flood, Vice President and General Manager for Operator Services at Pacific Bell,
stated that providing an individual employee notice that the employer is monitoring him, instead of
giving all employees a group notice that the employer is monitoring, may actually decrease the level
and quality customer service. Id. at 113 (statement of Thomas M. Flood).
The Air Transport Association of America stated that aural methods of notification will disrupt
airline telephone reservation systems by requiring the employee to explain to the customer why the
line is beeping. As a result, airlines will have to hire either additional reservation agents or force
customers to wait longer to speak with an agent. The Association argued that either result would
increase consumer costs. Id. at 197 (statement of Air Transport Association of America).
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knowledge of the specific instances of monitoring may adversely affect
the employee's state-of-mind rather than effectively protect the em-
ployee's privacy. 152 The simultaneous notice requirement unnecessarily
interferes with the employer's business.
Second, the proposed Act defines "electronic monitoring" too
broadly. 113  The scope of "electronic monitoring" protected by the Act
encompasses many employer security measures such as card access sys-
tems, security camera surveillance, inventory control systems and cash
registers.I 4 All of these devices collect data intentionally and indiscrimi-
nately.1 55 However, the Act only permits employers to intentionally col-
lect data about an employee that relates to that employee's work. 156 The
Act does not define the scope of an "employee's work" in relation to this
152. Id. at 59 (statement of Richard A. Barton, Senior Vice President, Government Affairs,
Direct Marketing Association). Barton argued that knowledge of monitoring may not only change
the behavior of an employee, but also may increase stress. The employee's performance may deterio-
rate because of the higher stress level induced by knowledge of the monitoring. Barton noted that
because of the increase in stress level, many telemarketing employees prefer that the employers no-
tify them when the employer monitors employees. Id.
153. H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 2(a)(A).
154. Section 2(l)(A) of the Act defines "electronic monitoring" to include: "the collection, stor-
age, analysis, or reporting of information ... by means of a computer, electronic observation and
supervision ... or other form of visual auditory, or computer-based technology which is conducted
by any method other than direct observation." See supra note 93. Many employers that appeared
before the Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations assumed that this definition encompassed
security devices. See Hearings on H.R. 1218, supra note 18, at 78-79 (statement of Vincent L. Ruf-
folo, President of A & R Securities) (noting in his testimony that the definition of "electronic moni-
toring" would encompass card access systems, security camera surveillance and reviews of bank and
telephone credit card usage); id. at 202 (statement of the National Retail Federation) (contending
that H.R. 1218's scope exceeds telephone monitoring and apparently encompasses monitoring and
collecting information through every and all imaginable types of electronic equipment or devices
including computers, cash registers, video machinery, calculators and inventory control equipment).
155. The proposed Act does exempt an employer who inadvertently collects data which is not
confined to an employee's work. H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 5(a)(2); see generally supra note 103
(no liability for inadvertent collection of data). However, the Act fails to define what constitutes an
inadvertent interception of information that is not related to an employee's work. For example, a
court could construe an inadvertent interception narrowly to include accidental interceptions of in-
formation which are not work related. Alternatively, a court could interpret an inadvertent inter-
ception of data unrelated to an employee's work to encompass all personal data collected by general
surveillance mechanisms. Under the broader definition, however, the requirement that employers
confine all personal data to an employee's work loses all force. Yet, only the broader construction of
an "inadvertent exception" would allow general surveillance cameras to avoid the requirement that
gathered data relate to the employee's work. The exception will eventually envelop the rule.
156. Section 5(a)(1) prohibits an employer from intentionally collecting personal data about an
employee that is not confined to the employee's work. H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 5(a)(1); see
generally supra note 103. The Act defines "personal data" as "any information concerning an em-
ployee which, because of name, identifying number, mark, or description, can be readily associated
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requirement. Consequently, the statute may not permit security camera
surveillance because it falls within the protected "electronic monitoring"
category, and the information collected may not fall within the statute's
definition of "employee's work." '157 Thus, the proposed Act would dis-
rupt the employer's ability to provide security measures, which prevent
loss and ensure customer and employee safety."' 8
Finally, the Act unnecesarily limits the employer's ability to assess in-
formation obtained through electronic monitoring. Under the proposed
Act, an employer may not use data collected by electronic monitoring as
the sole basis for evaluating employees or setting production expecta-
tions. 159 This provision severely inhibits the employer's right to decide
which individuals to employ or promote." ° If all of the employee's work
performance occurs on the telephone or the computer, the statute leaves
the employer with only a small amount of reliable information on which
with a particular individual, and such term includes information contained in printouts, forms, or
written analyses or evaluations." H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 2(4).
157. Clearly, an individual's picture on a videotape would fall within the somewhat vague defini-
tion of "personal data." See supra note 156. However, a security camera records everything within
the scope of its lens, not just information related to a particular individual's work performance. See
Hearings on H.R. 1218, supra note 18, at 81 (statement of Vincent L. Ruffolo, President of A & R
Securities) "Businesses where security camera surveillance is in place cannot distinguish, for obser-
vation and recording purposes, between work performance-related and other activities of employ-
ees." Id.
158. Hearings on H.R. 1218, supra note 18, at 204 (statement of the National Retail Federation)
("A comprehensive survey ... demonstrates the value of commonly used loss prevention equipment
and systems that would fall under the bill's extremely wide-ranging definition of 'electronic monitor-
ing'. . . Mass retailers employ these and similar devices for numerous legitimate reasons: to counter
the serious problems of internal and external theft and to assure the safety of their customers and
employees." Id.
159. H.R. 1218, supra note 20, §§ 6(bXl), 6(bX2). See also supra note 102 and accompanying
text.
The purpose of the restriction on setting production quotas or work performance expectations is
unclear. Moreover, the bill fails to specify whether the prohibition applies solely to data collected on
one individual or to aggregate data of a particular group. This data may constitute the most logical
source of information regarding acceptable production goals or quotas. See Hearings on H.R. 1218,
supra note 18, at 199 (statement of the Air Transport Association of America) ("There is nothing
inherently wrong in using electronic monitoring for that purpose.").
160. See Hearings on H.R. 1218, supra note 18, at 114 (statement of Thomas M. Flood, Vice
President and General Manager for Operator Services at Pacific Bell) ("The legislation should con-
sider an employer's right to take appropriate action under extreme circumstances."); see id. at 182-
83 (statement of The Food Marketing Institute) ("A restriction of this kind would severely limit an
employer's ability to evaluate the job performance of certain employees, such as truck drivers, data
processors, claims adjusters and other individuals who work with point-of-sale equipment and
computers.").
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to base an employment decision. t6 Furthermore, the provision prevents
an employer, who discovers that an employee is involved in illegal activ-
ity or theft, from taking disciplinary action based solely on the electroni-
cally acquired information.'62 Employers should retain full discretion in
establishing criteria for both hiring employees and their continued
employment.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR FEDERAL REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC
MONITORING IN THE WORKPLACE
Congress should approach the problem of monitoring in the work
place from a different perspective. Both Title III and the Privacy for
Consumers and Workers Act focus on specific methods of monitoring
and specific monitoring equipment. 163 This approach fails to remedy the
problem for two reasons. First, the law cannot immediately adapt to
changes in technology.' 4 Second, the problems with the proposed Act
161. See Hearings on H.R. 1218, supra note 18, at 183 (statement of the Food Marketing Insti-
tute) ("Because of the increasing size of the workforce and the changing nature of many jobs the
only effective way to evaluate some employees may be by electronic means with analysis or review of
collected data and print-outs. Under section 6(a), how does an employer evaluate a worker who has
a computer at home? ...Electronic data may be the only objective measure of employee
performance.").
162. See Hearings on HR. 1218, supra note 18, at 205 (statement of the International Mass
Retail Association, Inc.) ("Would the interests of the company, its customers or fellow workers be
better served by allowing the dishonest or unsatisfactory worker to remain in place until the same
conduct is repeated, this time before an eyewitness?"); see id. at 183 (statement of the Food Market-
ing Institute) ("In our opinion, the language contained in section 6(a) is extremely broad and will
likely prevent or delay an employer from taking appropriate action, such as disciplining or firing an
employee who is observed through electronic monitoring to have stolen merchandise, money from a
cash register or controlled drugs from the pharmacy department.").
163. For example, Title III defines "electronic monitoring" in terms of the specific equipment
covered by the Act. Title III includes information transferred by "wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photooptical system[s]" but excludes cordless telephones, tone-only paging de-
vices and tracking devices. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1988). See supra note 5. Even the business-
extension exception to Title III focuses on specified types of equipment. The exception provides an
employer a safe harbor only when an employee uses a telephone or telegraph component or facility.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
The proposed Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act also refers to specific types of devices. For
example, the Act excludes wiretapping devices as well as the electronic transfer of payroll and other
payroll-related information from the definition of "electronic monitoring." H.R. 1218, supra note
20, § 2(l)(C); see also supra note 93. The proposed Act also excludes electronic data obtained from
the use of an electronic card access system and the review of data appearing on multiple television
screens from the simultaneous notice requirement.
164. See Burnside, supra note 31, at 455. Burnside noted that Title III became antiquated
within 10 years of its enactment, and asserted that "technological advances occur so rapidly that the
laws do not always keep pace to ensure adequate privacy safeguards." Id.
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illustrate that drafting legislation in terms of specific prohibitions on the
employer fails because the legislation interferes with the employer's au-
tonomy.1 65 Instead, Congress should draft affirmative legislation which
grants employees specific rights.1 66 Affirmative legislation will effectively
balance the interests of employers and employees. 167
A. Employees' Affirmative Rights
Fairness of the monitoring process, privacy and autonomy comprise
the primary concerns raised by employees with regard to work place
monitoring.1 68  Congress should draft monitoring legislation that re-
sponds to these concerns. First, Congress should retain the provisions of
the proposed Act which require an employer to give current and prospec-
tive employees actual notice of the specific aspects of the employer's
monitoring policy. 169 This provision responds to employees' need for
control. If an employee understands the monitoring system, the em-
ployee can control her own performance so that it conforms with the
employer's requirements. 170
Second, Congress should require that monitoring employers indicate
which devices are monitored by affixing a prominent notice on the actual
device.' 71 Congress should also mandate that employers provide a suffi-
cient amount of unmonitored telephones or other devices for employees
165. See supra notes 148-62 and accompanying text.
166. The OTA Report suggested considering "[flederal legislation aimed at gaps in current law."
The OTA Report described two methods for filling the gaps: (1) general legislation which estab-
lishes affirmative rights for employees; and (2) legislation targeted toward specific monitoring prac-
tices. OTA Report, supra note 1, at 22. Congress should enact general legislation granting
employees rights within the work place.
167. See OTA Report, supra note 1, at 22. The OTA Report stated that enacting federal legisla-
tion which closes the gaps in current law constitutes one option for legislative reform. The Report
provided two possible approaches for structuring the legislation: general legislation which estab-
lishes specific rights for employees, or surgical legislation which responds to specific monitoring
practices. Id. General legislation is the better method because legislation which references specific
monitoring practices will inevitably become obsolete. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying
text.
168. See OTA Report, supra note 1, at 1. Generally, most of the employee's concerns relate to
the approach employers use to implement monitoring, the use of monitoring to motivate the employ-
ees, the manner in which employers use the information and the existence of the monitoring policy.
Id. at 89.
169. See H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 3. See also supra note 96 and accompanying text.
170. OTA Report, supra note 1, at 93.
171. Yet, this provision differs from the simultaneous notice provision of the proposed Act
which requires that an employer notify an employee as the monitoring occurs. See H.R. 1218, supra
note 20, § 3(a)(5). See also supra note 99. The prominent notice provision advocated by this propo-
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to use freely.172 This provision responds to employees' privacy and con-
trol concerns because the employee can decide whether to allow an em-
ployer to monitor a personal conversation by choosing the phone on
which to place the call.
Finally, the legislation should require employers to prepare and dis-
tribute written standards detailing how the employer will use the data
obtained by monitoring to evaluate employee performance. These writ-
ten standards should apply to any supervisor who evaluates other em-
ployees on the basis of monitored data. 173 The requirement that
employers explain how they will utilize the gathered information ad-
dresses concerns of fairness. 74 If an employer is forced to articulate the
purposes for using such data, market forces may dissuade an employer
from instituting a particularly onerous or abusive monitoring practice.171
Moreover, objective written standards for evaluation will obviate the
problem of supervisors rendering highly subjective evaluations.176
B. Defining the Scope of Covered Employers
Congress should avoid defining the scope of protective legislation in
terms of specific types of monitoring equipment already in existence.
177
sal merely requires an employer to identify clearly those devices that it monitors. The employer
need not indicate when the monitoring actually occurs.
172. See Hearings on H.R. 1218, supra note 18, at 61 (statement of Richard A. Barton, Senior
Vice President, Government Affairs, Direct Marketing Association). Barton argued that in lieu of
requiring beep tones, which negatively impact the purposes behind telephone monitoring, Congress
should amend H.R. 1218 to require: (1) notification stickers on monitored telephones, and (2) em-
ployee access to separate telephones for personal calls.
173. One of the primary allegations of unfair monitoring is "punitive use of monitoring informa-
tion by supervisors." OTA Report, supra note 1, at 1.
174. Whether or not monitoring is perceived as reasonable depends on: "(1) the fairness of the
standards set, (2) the fairness of the measurement process employed, and (3) the fairness of the way
measurements are used in employee evaluation." OTA Report, supra note 1, at 87.
175. See id. at 21. The OTA Report addressed the argument that no congressional action is
needed because natural "market forces" limit unfair monitoring. Id. If "market forces" will gener-
ally dissuade an employer from monitoring unfairly, market forces will likewise dissuade employers
from instituting an abusive policy when legislation forces the employer to disclose the unfair or
abusive practice.
176. See supra notes 173-75.
177. For example, Title III defines "electronic monitoring" in terms of communications trans-
mitted by "wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photo-optical systems." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(12) (1988). Similarly, the proposed Act defines "electronic monitoring" to include the collec-
tion of information transmitted by "wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photo-optical
system[s]." H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 2(1)(A); see also supra note 92. The drafters of the Act did
not indicate whether this list is inclusive or merely illustrative.
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Such definitions inevitably render any monitoring legislation obsolete be-
cause employee monitoring conducted by technologically-advanced de-
vices will eventually fall outside the scope of the legislation.178 Rather,
the legislation should define "monitoring employers" in terms of the act
of impersonal observation, rather than by the equipment used to conduct
the monitoring.17 9 Congress should also specify the standards that an
employer must meet when conducting impersonal observation.
C. Provisions of the Proposed Act Which Should be Retained
First, in order to further protect employee privacy, Congress should
adopt the provisions of the proposed Act which require an employer to
permit employee review of data, which limit disclosure and which pre-
vent monitoring in private places.'8 0 These provisions provide additional
safeguards against abusive monitoring without unduly burdening the em-
ployer's ability to manage the work process. 181
178. See Burnside, supra note 31, at 455 (arguing that technological advances occur so rapidly
that the law may not always keep pace).
179. The proposed Act attempts to define "electronic monitoring" in these terms; however, the
Act dilutes the scope of coverage by also providing a specific list of the types of transfers which the
Act will protect. See id. Specifically, the Act states that electronic monitoring covers any "form of
visual, auditory, or computer-based technology which is conducted by any method other than direct
observation by another person.. ." Id.
The broad scope of the protection advocated by this proposal will not unduly restrict an employer,
because the affirmative rights granted to the employee do not burden the employer to the extent that
the prohibitions of the proposed Act burden the employer. See supra notes 153-58 and accompany-
ing text.
180. H.R. 1218, supra note 20, §§ 4, 5. See also supra note 104.
181. Using the gathered data to discipline an employee illustrates the need for a requirement
which will permit an employee to review all the data upon request. When an employer questions the
employee regarding an incident which occurred weeks earlier, the employee may be unable to re-
spond adequately to the allegation. See Hearings on H.R. 1218, supra note 18, at 102 (statement of
Tom Higginbotham, General Chairman, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, AFL-CIO) ("When employees are questioned over conversations that could have taken
[place] days, even weeks before, after receiving hundreds of calls in the interim period, it is virtually
impossible to respond to false allegations.").
In addition, Congress needs to limit the disclosure of data that the employer gathers by monitor-
ing. In some cases, employers post data for no reason except to humiliate some employees. See
Hearings on H.R. 1218, supra note 18, at 16 (statement of Morton Bahr, President of the Communi-
cations Workers of America). Bahr testified that some employers post monitored data conspicu-
ously. Bahr stated: "[S]ome employers post conspicuously the daily time records of employees,
showing not only how long it takes for each worker to carry out his or her duties but also the time
used for bathroom breaks."
The undue invasion of privacy also concerns employees. See id. at 66-67 (statement of Ellen
Bravo, Associate Director, 9to5 National Association of Working Women) ("Some common themes
emerge, that monitoring too often.., invades privacy by enabling managers to snoop on personal
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Second, to facilitate employers' acceptance of the statute, Congress
needs to retain the provision exempting employers from providing spe-
cific notice of monitoring where "the employer has a reasonable suspi-
cion that an employee is engaged in conduct which violates criminal or
civil law." '82 This provision allows employers to protect against illegal
conduct without having to notify suspects that the employer is monitor-
ing their conversation. 18 3
D. Enforcement Provisions
Congress should retain all of the enforcement provisions of the pro-
posed Act, including the provisions authorizing civil penalties and pri-
vate rights of action for employees. 184 However, to enforce the provision
requiring employers to establish written standards for evaluation, Con-
gress should create an additional cause of action for an employee who
can demonstrate that an employer engaged in a pattern of gross deviation
from these standards. This provision will ensure that an employer does
not articulate one monitoring policy, and then actually practice a more
onerous and abusive policy. Finally, Congress should also adopt the
"whistleblower" provision of the proposed Act. The "whistleblower"
provision, which prevents an employer from taking any retaliatory action
against an employee who brings an action under the legislation,'85 will
ensure that employees retain a valid remedy.
CONCLUSION
A basic tension exists between an employer's right to manage the work
process and an employee's interest in maintaining autonomy, dignity and
privacy in the work place.'86 Neither existing legislation nor the pro-
posed Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act effectively balances these
calls and discussion between co-workers, count time spent in the bathroom and publicly post individ-
ual workers' performance.").
182. See H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 3(3)(A)(i). See also supra note 97 and accompanying text.
183. See Hearings on H.R. 1218, supra note 18, at 82 (statement of Vincent L. Ruffolo, President
of A & R Security). Discussing the simultaneous notice requirement of the proposed Act, Ruffolo
acknowledged that the beep requirement puts employers "in the absurd position of having to advise
suspected thieves that they are being observed." Id. The same logic holds true for requiring employ-
ers to give notice of monitoring to employees suspected of illegal activity.
184. H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 7. See also supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text. How-
ever, the enforcement provisions of the proposed Act are substantially the same as the enforcement
provisions contained in Title III. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1988).
185. See H.R. 1218, supra note 20, § 8. See also supra note 105 and accompanying text.
186. OTA Report, supra note I, at 2.
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two interests.1" 7 Current law fails to delineate any discernable rights be-
tween employers and employees.1 8 The proposed Act unduly burdens
the ability of the employer to manage the work process. Currently, the
law contains no requirements that employers conduct "fair" monitor-
ing.' 89 Legislation granting affirmative rights to employees mandates fair
practices by employers without unduly burdening the management pro-
cess. Congress should pass legislation granting employees specific rights
in the work place.
Susan Ellen Bindler
187. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
188. See OTA Report, supra note 1, at 2.
189. Id.
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